Volume 49

Issue 2

Article 7

10-2011

Revisiting the Battle of Baytown: Unions, Reds, and Mayhem in a
Company
Michael Botson

The East Texas Historical Journal is a publication of the East Texas Historical Association
(ETHA). The ETHA is a membership organization founded in 1962 to support research into the
unique histories of East Texas and to educate and engage others in the effort.
More information about the ETHA is available at www.easttexashistorical.org
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/ethj
Part of the United States History Commons

Tell us how this article helped you.

Provide feedback to ETHA.

Recommended Citation
Botson, Michael (2011) "Revisiting the Battle of Baytown: Unions, Reds, and Mayhem in a Company," East
Texas Historical Journal: Vol. 49: Iss. 2, Article 7.
Available at: https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/ethj/vol49/iss2/7

This Article has been accepted for inclusion in the East Texas Historical Journal by an authorized editor of ETHA
and SFA. This Article is brought to you free and open access by the Journals at SFA ScholarWorks. For more
information, please contact cdsscholarworks@sfasu.edu.

Revisiting the Battle ofBaytown: Unions, Reds, and Mayhem
in a Company Town

By

MICHAEL BOTSON

In their 1958 monumental history of Baytown's Humble Oil and
Refining Company, prominent business historians Henrietta Larson
and Kenneth Porter devoted only fifty of their study's 769 pages to the
company's labor history. Unsurprisingly, as business historians they
focused their attention on the men who established and managed the
company rather than the employees who worked there. ' In summing up
the defeat of two union organizing drives between 1936 and 1943, they
concluded that "'Humble employees simply were not interested in an
outside union. They had become convinced that their own federations
were effective agencies for collective bargaining with management."2
Moreover, Larson and Porter dismissed critics who suggested
employees' loyalty to Humble Oil smacked of feudalism and that they
were somehow "inferior in stamina to other oil companies' employees
who, in the face of more serious attempts at [management] coercion,
had organized and won bargaining rights for Oil Workers International
locals. m
However, their simplistic conclusion leaves unanswered one
important question: How, in fact, did Humble Oil and Refining
Company defeat two Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO)
organizing campaigns during the union's peak popularity while
workers in all other major refineries along the upper Texas Gulf Coast
successfully organized powerful CIO unions and secured collective
bargaining rights?
Several factors affect the answer to this dilemma. First is
Humble Oil's tradition of anti-unionism reflected in the labor relations
philosophy of its conservative, southern founders, Ross Sterling, Walter
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Fondren, Robert Siaffer and William Farish. Under their leadership
the company crushed its employees' first union organizing campaign
during the Goose Creek Oil Field Strike in 1917. 4 In 1920 Humble
Oil and Refining became part of John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil
Corporation of New Jersey and adopted Standard's antiunion policy
as laid out under the Colorado Industrial Relations Plan. 5 The plan
consisted of fOUf elements: a corporate welfare system, a grievance
procedure, an employees' bill of rights, and lastly Joint Councils,
eventually called Employee Representation Plans, which contained
employee elected representatives along with management appointed
members.

C.S. Stone, the first
person hired to
work for Humble
oil in Baytown
leading a yoke
ofoxen hauling
heavy equipment
to the refinery
construction site,
circa 1917.
Photo courstesy of
Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University New Haven, CT.

The Plan appeared to establish joint governance between
management and employees, but the agreements formulated in the
Counci Ilacked substance because they were not the result ofnegotiations
between two parties which held equal power and had learned to respect
each other's economic strength. As a result there was never any agency
to compel employers to honor agreements reached through the Joint
Counci1. 6 Paternalistic in nature and anti-union in objective, the Plan
allowed management to retain control over industrial relations with an
iron fist as demonstrated when Humble Oil's Joint Conference figured
prominently in management's defeat of the CI01s organizing drive
in 1936. [n addition to the Joint Conference, other factors led to the
CIO's defeat, including managements, intimidation of CIO members,
10
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and alliance of anti·union local businessmen, their trade associations and
newspaper editors who rallied against the CIO, "Red" and race baiting,
and, finally, the Union ~s misguided decision to call a strike.
The battle between pro- and anti-union factions in Baytown
actually dated back to 1934 when Humble employees Bob Oliver and
Roy Childers first established Local No. 333 of the Oil Workers Union
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL). At the time the
union claimed 1,400 members, approximately sixty percent of Humble's
2,300 employees. Oliver requested a union certification election under
the authority of the Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA). Management refused to hold an ejection based on its opposition
to recognizing the union as the sole collective bargaining agent for its
employees. Local No. 333 responded by appealing to the Petroleum
Labor Policy Board to certity the union without an election but before
the Board could take any action the Supreme Court declared the NIRA
unconstitutional in May, 1935 thus making the issue mute. 8
Local No. 333 abandoned the AFL in 1936 over philosophical and
organizing differences, and they affiliated with the newly fonned CIO.
Although employees expressed continuing interest in the union, they
remained well-aware that the company disdained it. Twice between
September, 1935, and March, 1936, management refused to meet with
Oliver and Childers to discuss union recognition, wages, promotions,
and seniority rights. The company took the position that in these matters
management would only consider individual cases and would not enter
into any binding agreement with the Union over these issues or recognize
it as the collective bargaining agent for its employees.
Nonetheless, by late summer 1936, the union's growing numbers
and potential influence could not be ignored. Consequently, management
consented to meet with Oliver, Childers, and other union officials to
discuss union recognition, wages, promotions, and seniority rights.
Company officials partly met with union representatives because the
union's growing presence could not be dismissed, but they also could not
ignore the newly passed Wagner Act, which had empowered workers to
organize unions. Like other companies at the time, Humble Oil officials
were willing to meet with union representatives as a show of complying
with the Jaw, while, at the same time, stalling negotiations, hoping the
U.S. Supreme Court would rule the Wagner Act unconstitutional in a case
filed against it by the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation. The meeting
took place in the refinery's administrative offices on September 4. 10
11
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The day before the meeting, management distributed an open letter
from executive vice president Harry Weiss that poisoned the atmosphere.
In it, he praised the company~s hannonious history of labor relations
and condemned the CIO organizers as outside agitators detennined to
cause trouble. Weiss ignored the fact that Humble~s employees worked
as organizers and that hundreds of employees had joined the CIO. In
part the letter proclaimed:
The leaders of this movement are outsiders who seek
to impose their rule on the rest of us. The success of
efforts of this kind is dependent upon coercion, and
that is the root of the evil. This insidious force can
be best combated by the resistance of the employees
themselves. The Company will stand behind you with
all possible support. ll
Weiss's letter became the opening broadside against the CIO, even
before management met with union officials. It left no doubt in the
minds of employees as to the company's attitude towards the union.
From that point on, the anti-CIO assault became a highly orchestrated~
systematic campaign that ultimately defeated the union's organizing
drive in 1936.
The meeting's transcript is an object lesson in obfuscation.
Management representatives tied every issue introduced by Bob Oliver
and other union officials into linguistic knots, however, one thing
does clearly stand out in spite of managemenfs circumlocution, and
that was the company's unequivocal refusal to recognize the CIO as
the collective bargaining agent of its employees. During the meeting
union officials Bob Oliver and C.C. Fogerty pointedly asked the
head of management's delegation, D.B. Harris, to sign a contract and
recognize the union. Harris refused, saying that, "We are not willing
to write a contract ... We are not willing to sign an agreement to treat
your group any differently in any other respect, either better or any
worse than the rest of the employees."'2 Harris went further, saying
that the company would not recognize any third party as the employees'
exclusive collective bargaining agent, and restated its policy to meet
with employees on an individual basis to settle any labor disagreements.
A policy he noted, which had worked satisfactorily for years. l ) Oliver
bitterly disagreed.
12
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He chastised Harris for "[s]etting up [himself] as the man to pass
judgment on what is satisfactory or what is not satisfactory. I say to you
there is a large percentage of your employees who do not accept it as
satisfactory. You know this is a serious situation."14 Harris responded by
hewing to the line that even if Local No. 333 represented one hundred
percent of Humble's employees, management would not recognize it
or any other organization as their collective bargaining agent. But, in
fact, during the previous fourteen years management had "fostered,
encouraged and supported the Joint Conference in its refinery and
conditioned its employees to collective dealing through it. '\15 The
meeting ended with this impasse. Outraged at Humble's intransigence
and duplicity, Oliver and his organizers responded to management's
hardball tactics by re-energizing their organizing efforts.
Almost immediately after the organizing efforts began, a rumor
quickly spread throughout Baytown that the CIO would strike if
management did not recognize the union. The source of the rumor
has never been discovered, but it crippled the CIO's organizing effort
by focusing public attention on the potential of a violent strike. 16 Jt
clouded the union's message of trying to cast itself as a responsible
and effective employee advocate, making it nearly impossible to cast
the CIO in a positive light. The rumored strike forced organizers into
curtail ing recruiting efforts and into defending the CIO against charges
that it was comprised of agitators bent on anarchy in Baytown.
The fear of a potentially violent strike hamstrung the ClO's
recruiting efforts and perhaps, even more importantly, convinced many
members to drop out of the union. In early August the union claimed
1,400 members; but after the strike rumor spread, membership quickly
dropped to approximately 800. 17 Beginning in August and until the
union capitulated in September, the strike issue colored the rnetoric
hurled back-and-forth by the antagonists, heightening passions in
Baytown to the boiling point.
Management ordered foremen to gauge union strength by trying
to identify CIO members; to stigmatize them as troublemakers; to
voice management's displeasure with union members; and, finally, to
intimidate employees undecided about joining the union. Management
ordered a garage foreman to conduct a straw poll among his employees
to gauge strike sympathy. Foremen throughout the refinery conducted
similar polls and directly challenged known CIO organizers and
members. In the inspection department, its foreman confronted a union
13
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organizer about his union activities, in particular about his recruiting
visits to African American employees' homes, an action overstepping
the racial boundaries of Jim Crow segregation. The foreman cautioned
him, saying, "Well it looks like to me that they are letting you do the
dirty work over there .. guiding these Negroes around Baytown ..
.That will get you into trouble sooner or later ...you are letting [union
organizers] Bob Oliver and Roy Childers make a sap out of yoU."18
The accuracy of these polls is suspect since many CIO members would
not publicly acknowledge membership fearing management reprisals.
The subtle though unequivocal message management communicated
through these polls was that Humble Oil and Refining regarded CIO
membership as disloyalty to the company and that those who joined fell
from favor and jeopardized their jobs.
An additional factor that hurt the CIO included the Texas
Communist Party '5 support ofthe union's organizing efforts in Baytown.
Texas Communist Party head Homer Brooks praised the CIO as the
only "industrial form of organization capable of meeting and defeating
the huge financial interests in the mass producing industries such as
oil."19 Brooks' enthusiastic support of the CIO's industrial unionism,
his endorsement of the CIO's commitment to racial equality~ and his
assertion that "[t]he interests of the Party are identical with the labor
movement," all played into hands of union critics. Though the SabineHouston Branch of the Texas Communist Party voiced support for the
CIO's efforts in Baytown, there is no evidence that Homer Brooks or
any Communists worked in Baytown as organizers. 2o
The union's call for interracial unionism and the abolition of Jim
Crow segregation prompted searing attacks and condemnation of the
CIa from racists. Bulletins issued by the Joint Conference's successor
organization, the Employees Federation, accurately reflect the hysteria,
racist passions, and fear unleashed by race-baiting in southeast Texas
during that era. One bulletin warned, ~'The CIO in its frantic struggle for
more votes is secretly carrying on a campaign among Negro workers
intended to cause serious trouble ...They promise that all forms ofracial
separation shall be abolished ... We call upon you free white America
workers of Baytown refinery to give your active help [to stop this]."
Additionally, the arrival in Baytown of African American dockworkers
from Houston and other outlying Gulf Coast ports to rally black support
for the CIa fanned racial fears among uneasy whites that militant black
longshoremen would attack strikebreakers. 21

Revisiting the Battle ofBaytown

Baytown quickly polarized between those supporting the union
and those opposed. Raising the banner of preserving law and order,
the newly formed Tri-Cities Citizens Committee, composed of antiunion employees, prominent local businessmen, bankers, the Chamber
of Commerce, and newspaper publishers, mobilized to marshal public
opinion against the CIO. The fiercely anti-union Clifford Bond,
influential publisher of the News Tribune, used his newspaper as a
platfonn to condemn the CIO. 22 In a bold two-column front page story
on September 16, 1936, Bond vilified union president Bob Oliver:
I have found that a young and ambitious man by
the name of Bob Oliver, some three years ago, chose
the Tri-Cities area as a fertile field to become a sort of
·'Czar, Mussolini, Hitler, or what have you?" among
the laboring men of the Tri-Cities .. He was able to
rally gullible individuals in the employ of the Humble
Refinery . . . I have found that after drawing a fat
salary from the dues of the members, Mr. Oliver firtally
reached a point where it became necessary for him to
either "deliver the goods or get off the receptacle'~ (if
you get what I mean).23
Bond had no qualms about mixing "isms" in his denunciation of
Oliver and the union. He fell back on the common anti-union tactic
of stereotyping big labor bosses as racketeers who are out to enrich
themselves by soaking union members for dues. Other Committee
members volunteered to give anti-union speeches, engaged in an
aggressive pamphleteering campaign in conjunction with Humblels
Security League, and organized mass rallies to coordinate public
opinion against the CIO.24
The Tri-City Citizens' Committee heJped anti-ClO employees
organize a back-to-work association in preparation for the strike. The
association petitioned local law enforcement agencies to deputize
non-striking employees and private citizens so they could protect
strikebreakers who crossed CIO picket lines l actions that turned the
Baytown refinery into an anned camp. Management began stockpiling
food and arranging sleeping accommodations for employees who
wanted to remain in the refinery during the strike, and even looked
into the feasibility of landing cargo planes on refinery property to keep
15
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Photos on pages 16 and 17 are construction a/the refinery's mechanical
shops, circa 1919. The tent city in the background housed African American
and Mexican laborers. Photos courtesy a/Sterling Memorial Library, Yale
University. New Haven, eT.

the workforce supplied. By the third week of September, the tension
in Baytown had reached a fever pitch, leading to fears of violence. 25
Union activism raised race and class anxieties, the fear of communism
led to fears of radicalism, and perhaps most important, the power of
Humble Oil and Refining Company hung in the Baytown air like vapors
from its refinery, ready to ignite into a full-blown war.
After a promising start, the CIO soon found itself on the defensive
and quickly lost ground. To publicize the CIO's position and regain
control over the issues, Bob Oliver published a letter in the Houston
Chronicle laying out the union's objectives in Baytown. The letter
reiterated the CIO's demand for recognition as the employees'
collective bargaining agent and requested wage increases and seniority
to become a basis for consideration in promotions, demotions, transfers
,and layoffs.:!6 Management flatly turned down all of Oliver's demands,
thereby forcing the union's hand. Oliver then reluctantly called for a
strike vote, which the rank-and-file approved with a tally of787 to 57:~7
The union set September 18 as the strike date. On September 16~ the
Tri-Cities Citizens' Committee and the Joint Conference placed a half
-page ad in the Houston Chronicle, proclaiming, ~'We do not believe
16
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there is justification for a strike in the Baytown Refinery." 28 Another
article in the same edition cited an unsubstantiated report that 3,100
of the refinery's employees signed an anti-strike pledge circulated by
officers of the Joint Conference. 29
Adding to the cro's woes was an attack within organized labor.
The members of the Intemational Association of Machinists, Local
No. 1051 (AFL), which represented skilled machinists in the refinery,
opposed the strike. Although the machinists' union only represented
Humbles 108 skilled machinists, a small fraction of the overall
workforce, its opposition to the strike was a humiliating blow to the CIO
by publicly displaying the bitterness within Baytown's house of labor.
}O
The machinists' position might have been expected, given that the
CIO and AFL were mortal enemies stemming from bitter disagreements
over racial policies, as well as craft versus industrial union tensions.

The AFL routinely opposed CIO organizing efforts and engaged in
race- and Red-baiting against the CIO similar to that of companies and
anti-union workers.} I
Under great pressure, Bob Oliver and members of Local No.
333 rethought the strike amidst rapidly growing disillusionment with
the CIO and decided to hold another vote on the eve of the walkout.
Its adversaries had whipped up hysteria in Baytown by successfully
stigmatizing the union as bent on class warfare, racial radicalism, and
communism. In the second vote, the union unanimously decided to caJl
off the strike, thereby ending the first battle for Baytown between pro

17
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and anti-union factions and representing a resounding defeat for the
CIO. J2 However, was it defeated, as Larson and Porter concluded, due
to Humble's employees simply not being interested in a union like the
CIO? Upon careful re-examination~ the picture appears much more
complex.
Pro-CIO employees faced an uphill battle on numerous fronts in
their effort to organize the refinery. A plethora of factors, including
management's historic anti·unionism dating back to the Goose Creek oil
field strike in 1917, its implementation of Standard Oil of New Jersey's
labor policies that included the Joint Conference as a means to foster
employee loyalty and discourage unionization, cooperation between
management and the hastily formed Tri-City Citizens' Committee
coordinating community opposition to the CIO, Red- and race-baiting
to smear the union, and the strike rumor, all coalesced to defeat the CIO.
It is essential to note that over the key issue that led to the
unraveling of the CIG's organizing campaign, the origin of the strike
rumor, there is disagreement between Larson and Porter and the official
Labor Board records. Larson and Porter suggest the rumor originated
from the CIO as a threat to bully the company into recognizing the
union without actually going on strike; but in a Labor Board hearing
held afterwards, the official record shows that the source of the rumor
was never discovered. The nature of this disagreement is critically
important in trying to Wlderstand the historical significance of the CIO's
defeat, since prior to the rumored strike the union enjoyed significant
popularity in Baytown, which Larson and Porter recognized.J3
Furthennore, an announcement of the union's intention to strike
ran counter to the CIO's overall national strategy in 1936 and early
1937. Facing reactionary anti-union forces throughout industrial
America, similar to the ones encountered in Baytown, CIO leaders
understood that a strike should be a last resort for several reasons.
Despite the perception of rising worker militancy, solidarity, and class
consciousness during the depression, these were not characterizations
universally accepted by American workers. Many remained Joyal to
their companies and company unions, while still others sat-on-thefence. waiting see whether management or labor prevailed before
joining the CIO. 34
The great Flint sit-down strike against General Motors, from
December 1936 to February 1937, is the best example of this; and
although it resulted in an unprecedented victory for workers and
18
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organized labor, the CIO authorized the strike as a desperate last resort
and planned it in complete secrecy. Only a handful of Flint's autoworkers
participated in the strike, while large numbers ofGM workers opposed,
or simply watched with detachment.J5 It was risky business to join a
un ion, and a fai led strike would like ly cost a striker his job. All of these
factors came into play during the CIO's Baytown organizing campaign
and drove union president, Bob Oliver, to exclaim in frustration, "Hell,
I am opposed to it too. We decided to call the strike as a last resort. What
we want is to get the Humble Oil and Refining Company to reason with
U5."l6

The strike rumor could very well have emanated from any of
Baytown's anti-CIO factions, such as a member of the Tri-Citie5
Citizens' Committee, the Joint Council, management, or even from an
agent provocateur who infiltrated the CIO. The report of the La Follette
Civil Liberties Committee, chaired by Wisconsin Senator Robert La
Follette, conclusively demonstrated that labor spies from private
detective agencies hired by corporations had infiltrated the CIO from its
founding, so it is conceivable that the strike rumor could have originated
from an agent provocateur or by any ofthe groups in Baytown opposing
the union. 37 This, of course, is an important avenue of future research.
In summing up labor's defeat in the first Battle for Baytown, it
is much more complicated than the conclusion of Larson and Porter
that employees in Humble's refinery "were not interested in an outside
union."38 An examination and analysis of the forces arrayed against
Humble's employees loyal to the CIO and their effort to organize the
refinery, it is clear they faced a collection of adversaries who coalesced
into an unassailable anti-union front. It is not so much a surprise that
they suffered a defeat as it is a wonder how they managed to do as well
as they did.
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